By Bradford Delong

In the past six months the trade issue in the United States has taken a sharp downward spiral. Most depressing of all has been the blaming of NAFTA--free trade with Mexico--for the current ills of the American economy. This is ridiculous: the Mexican economy is too small for it to have any material effect on the distribution of income and employment in America, positive or negative.

Now NAFTA has been somewhat of a disappointment, but for very different reasons than its impact on the United States. Think of it this way: The key argument in favor of NAFTA had been that it was the most promising road the United States could take to raise the chances for Mexico to become democratic and prosperous, and that the US had both a strong selfish interest and a strong neighborly duty to try to help Mexico develop.

Since NAFTA, Mexican real GDP has grown at 3.6% per year, and exports have boomed, going from 10% of GDP in 1990 and 17% of GDP in 1999 to 28% of GDP today. Next year, Mexico’s real exports will be five times what they were in 1990. NAFTA guarantees Mexican producers tariff and quota-free access to the US market, the largest consumer market in the world. Without this guarantee, fewer would have invested in the capacity to satisfy the US market. Increasing trade between the US and Mexico moves both countries toward a greater degree of specialization and a finer division of labor. Such efficiency gains from increasing the extent of the market and promoting specialization should have produced rapid growth in Mexican productivity. Likewise, greater efficiency should have been reinforced by a boom in capital formation, which should have accompanied the guarantee that no future wave of protectionism in the US would shut factories in Mexico.

The key word here is "should." Today’s 100 million Mexicans have real incomes – at purchasing power parity – of roughly ＄10,000 per year, a quarter of the current US level. They are investing perhaps a fifth of GDP in gross fixed capital formation – a healthy amount – and have greatly expanded their integration into the world (i.e., the North American) economy since NAFTA.

But the 3.6% rate of growth of GDP, coupled with a 2.5% per year rate of population and increase, means that Mexicans’ mean income is barely 15% above that of the pre-NAFTA days, and that the gap between their mean income and that of the US has widened. Because of rising inequality, the overwhelming majority of Mexicans live no better off than they did 15 years ago. Successful neo-liberal policies have not delivered the rapid increases in productivity and working-class wages that neo-liberals like me would have confidently predicted had we been told back in 1995 that Mexican exports would multiply five-fold in the next twelve years.

To be sure, economic deficiencies still abound in Mexico. According to the OECD, these include a very low average number of years of schooling, with young workers having almost no more formal education than their older counterparts; little on-the-job training; heavy bureaucratic burdens on firms; corrupt judges and police; high crime rates; and a large, low-productivity informal sector that narrows the tax base and raises tax rates on the rest of the economy. But these deficiencies should not be enough to neutralize Mexico’s powerful geographic advantages and the potent benefits of neo-liberal policies, should they?

Apparently they are.

We neo-liberals point out that NAFTA did not cause poor infrastructure, high crime, and official corruption. We thus implicitly suggest that Mexicans would be far worse off today without NAFTA and its effects weighing in on the positive side of the scale.

That neo-liberal story may be true. But it is an excuse. It may not be true. Having witnessed Mexico’s slow growth over the past 15 years, we can no longer repeat the old mantra that the neo-liberal road of NAFTA and associated reforms is clearly and obviously the right one.

But this does not mean that NAFTA is responsible for slow economic growth in Ohio. That the American political system is blaming it is terrifically depressing.

Perhaps the way to look at it is that the American political system is grappling with the right issues in the wrong way. For on the broader issues of "fair" and "free" trade, there are important political questions. Let me outline how it appears to me, from my eastern-side-of-the-Pacific rich-country-citizen perspective.

In general, the question of "free" versus "fair" trade has three baskets: an environmental regulation basket, a labor-standards and freedom basket, and a "wages basket."

The first two can, I think, be disposed of quickly. We don’t want those able to bribe governments in other countries to poison people or the globe by turning other countries into pollution havens. We don’t want environmental standards to be used to freeze the world distribution of wealth and keep people in other countries hungry, illiterate, and barefoot. The difficulties that remain are those of implementation. To advance the first requires that rich countries exert enormous pressure on poor countries to make environmental protection a strong priority. To advance the second requires that that pressure be not such as to cripple trade and enable destructive protectionism among the currently rich.

Similarly, we want expanding trade to be a force for opportunity rather than for oppression: we like it when expanded trade gives ordinary people a path to a better life; we don’t like it when expanded trade gives rich and powerful people in the cloud city of Stratos an incentive to round others up and put them to work in the xenite mines. As then-Principal Deputy IMF Managing Director Stanley Fischer warned the great and good at the 2000 Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Jackson Hole Conference, there is nothing in the ILO’s principles that we cannot and very little that we should not be eager to endorse, all of us. The difficulties that remain are, once again, those of implementation. Once again, pressure to convince poor-country governments that their societies are much better off if they accord their people human rights--freedom of speech, worship, and assembly--political rights, and social rights--the right to organize, the right to become educated, the right to be protected by a social safety net. But also, once again, such pressure will be destructive if it becomes a twentieth-century reincarnation of nineteenth-century imperialism.

The question of trade and wages remains: To what extent are rich countries obligated to open their markets to poor countries when the consequence is falling wages for the poor in the rich--bearing in mind that the poor in the rich are often wealthier and have more opportunity than the rich in the poor? To what extent do rich countries do themselves well--serve their national interest--by opening their markets to poor countries even when the consequence is falling wages for the poor in the rich? These are very hard questions that I cannot answer in any comprehensive manner.

However, let me make four remarks on this "trade and wages" basket:

First, between 1950 and 1997 trade and wages weren’t an issue for America: America’s foreign trading partners raised their own relative wage levels at least as fast as globalization enhanced their influence, and there was no net effect of trade on wages--no link from greater openness to the global economy to greater inequality here at home.

Second, at times between 1950 and 1997 trade and wages became a political issue in America as a way of distracting attention from true problems. The voters of Michigan in 1985 did not want to hear that the problems of Michigan’s manufacturing industries were home-grown—in the fecklessness of management and in the Reagan administration’s budget deficits that pushed up interest rates which pushed up the value of the dollar and made the goods they made uncompetitive on world markets. They wanted, instead, to hear that the Japanese were doing something clever and illegitimate.

Third: since 1997 or so the link between expanded imports and wage inequality has become real, as our imports now embody a much larger amount of factors competing with our own lesser-skilled than they used to. How large? I don’t think we know. Paul Krugman is now writing a paper for the Brookings Institution in which he essentially throws up his hands at the question. But there are two points worth noting: (a) the effects of trade on pre-tax wage inequality are much smaller than the effects over the past generation of changes in the tax system on after-tax income inequality; (b) the effects of trade on inequality of opportunity are much less than the effects of educational inequities on inequality of opportunity.

Fourth, to the extent that we in the United States begin thinking of trade restrictions as a way to fight inequality, we are setting ourselves up for extraordinary trouble late in this century--extraordinary damage to our long-run national security.

Think of it this way: Consider a world that contains one country that is a true superpower. It is preeminent--economically, technologically, politically, culturally, and militarily. But it lies at the east edge of a vast ocean. And across the ocean is another country--a country with more resources in the long-run, a country that looks likely to in the end supplant the current superpower. What should the superpower’s long-run national security strategy be?

I think the answer is clear: if possible, the current superpower should embrace its possible successor. It should bind it as closely as possible with ties of blood, commerce, and culture--so that should the emerging superpower come to its full strength, it will to as great an extent possible share the world view of and regard itself as part of the same civilization as its predecessor: Romans to their Greeks.

In 1877, the rising superpower to the west across the ocean was the United States. The preeminent superpower was Britain. Today the preeminent superpower is the United States. The rising superpower to the west across the ocean is China. In the past, the United States was the rising superpower across the ocean to the west of the world’s industrial and military leader. Today it is China.

Throughout the twentieth century it has been greatly to Britain’s economic benefit that America has regarded it as a trading partner—a source of opportunities--rather than a politico-military-industrial competitor to be isolated and squashed. And in 1917 and again in 1941 it was to Britain’s immeasurable benefit--its very soul was on the line--that America regarded it as a friend and an ally rather than as a competitor and an enemy. A world run by those whom de Gaulle called les Anglo-Saxons is a much more comfortable world for Britain than the other possibility--the world in which Europe were run by Adolf Hitler’s Saxon-Saxons.

There is a good chance that China is now on the same path to world preeminence that America walked 130 years ago. Come 2047 and again in 2071 and in the years after 2075, America is going to need China. There is nothing more dangerous for America’s future national security, nothing more destructive to America’s future prosperity, than for Chinese schoolchildren to be taught in 2047 and 2071 and in the years after 2075 that America tried to keep the Chinese as poor as possible for as long as possible.