By Hu Shuli

On April 4, the gavel came down for the sentencing of Chen Liangyu. This former member of the Politburo and one-time Shanghai party secretary will spend 18 years in prison after being found guilty of taking bribes and abusing his official powers. Since last June, we have seen a series of connected court cases concerning economic crimes committed in relation to the Shanghai pension scandal come to trial in Shanghai, Tianjin, Anhui and Jilin (see our cover stories Judgment in the Shanghai Pension Scandal Case, Shattered Halo for a Shanghai Magnate, and The Trial of Chen Liangyu). Now, we have an opportunity to take time to reflect and put the matter in perspective.

There is much to reflect on. While many things remain to be done, two must be given priority: The drafting, promulgation and resolute implementation of a “sunshine law;” and issuance of a system of rules governing the behavior of the family and close colleagues of leading officials. This is a fundamental step for the successful implementation of a strategy for fighting and preventing corruption, and for the rebuilding of public confidence.

The sunshine law means that in China we should implement a system for declaring, registering and disclosing the family assets of public employees, particularly high officials. We should require that the personal wealth of officials be made a matter of public record by law and allow the public full opportunity to exercise oversight.

As far back as 1995, the Central Party Office and the Office of the State Council issued Regulations for the Declaration of Income for Leading Cadres in Party and Government Agencies at County (Department) Level and Higher. In June 2001, the Central Organization Department and CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection further issued a trial version of Regulations for Reporting the Family Assets of Serving Provincial and Ministry-level Leading Cadres. But instead of legislation, these systems remained to be only administrative regulations, whose content and implementation fell far short of international common practice. Their real-world impact was nugatory. For example, the 2001 regulations widened the scope for declaring income to officials' family members, including spouses and minor children. Yet, in the light of international experience and the reality on the ground in China, such a scope is still too narrow, leaving out as it does the adult children of high officials, their siblings and others with direct family links. It is quite clearly of no help in achieving the goal of ending corruption from its roots.

The Chen Liangyu case proves this point. His son was over 30 years old and was no longer in need of parental support. His younger brother was also over 50. Yet when Chen abused his powers and took bribes, he did it through these adult relatives. A legal stipulation that the assets of his son and brother were to be made public would have acted as a clear restraint on this kind of criminal behavior.

The methods and procedures for reporting officials' assets should be strict and transparent. Although existing regulations require reporting, this is to be done through officials' work unit personnel departments, which provides no restraining threat for officials of the same rank. The reporting results are also kept secret, and there are no channels for ordinary citizens to ask about the reports or exercise oversight. Nor can the media expose any wrongdoing. With this kind of reporting process, if they would at least go through the motions, we could count ourselves lucky. But it is impossible to restrain official wrongdoing in any way. Thus, beginning in 1996, Chen's wife Huang Yiling took a salary from a company that she worked for in name only, while Chen continued to be promoted without any effect on his career. This example clearly shows that the reporting rules have no teeth.

Sunshine laws are commonly used to fight corruption worldwide. They are in place in more than 90 countries. China has already acceded to the U.N. Convention against Corruption, which clearly stipulates that signatory states should establish effective systems for reporting officials' assets in accord with domestic laws. Seen in this light, it is not just a matter of China's own building of rule of law that makes the rapid implementation of a sunshine law pressing, but it is also an international duty we have accepted. Every year at the NPC, there are representatives who raise proposals for sunshine laws. These have widespread support, and there is no reason to continue delay. The so-called argument that “the conditions don't exist” does not stand up to scrutiny. As the most recent NPC drew to a close, the negative Chen Liangyu case shed light on the need for such a law.

As for bringing out a law restraining the behavior of relatives and close colleagues of senior officials, although such measures have fewer precedents internationally, they are something that China's “national characteristics” make essential. In recent years, a large number of corruption cases have involved abuse of power by secretaries of senior officials. One of the key parts of the Chen Liangyu case bears careful consideration: the Shanghai pension scandal largely came to light because of events surrounding Zhang Rongkun, yet Chen Liangyu was only accused of abuse of power in that case, and neither he nor any relative profited directly from any association with Zhang.
 
The most aggressive trader in power for money at the time was the then-Shanghai party secretary's personal secretary, Wang Weigong. In early 2002, as mayor of Shanghai, Chen had dinner with Zhang and promised to “help” the latter in his affairs. This dinner was set up by Wang. Between 2000 and the breaking of the pension scandal in June 2006, Wang accepted bribes on 14 occasions from Zhang, first in Shanghai and later in Beijing. The bribes totaled 9.33 million yuan (US ＄1.33 million), most of which was given in cash (see the story on Zhang Rongkun in this issue). That a person in high office should accept bribes from a single individual is enough to make anyone angry. Wang's links to Zhang were also solidified through the offices of Chen's personal secretary Qin Yu, who received no small amount of money from Zhang.

We can see that, in the Shanghai pension scandal, the actions of the personal secretaries Wang and Qin are already extreme examples of the way close colleagues can abuse the power of those they work for. Relatives of high officials, their personal secretaries and indeed the relatives of those personal secretaries are absolutely prohibited from acting on behalf of their official bosses, something that is of course common knowledge.

The Party Center and State Council have issued a number of documents in recent years seeking to restrict such behavior. Some were issued in 1986, '98 and 2004. If we do not view Wang and Qin as exceptional cases at the very least, instead, hope to learn from the examples of people like them, we must admit that in the complex social environment of China in this period of transition, it is very easy for rent-seeking activities of power to expand through cronies and that there are serious gaps in the existing system of prevention. Thus, it remains an important task as we build government systems that we bring forward a set of regulations with real power to restrain wrongdoing and encourage those around senior officials to act honestly, fairly, carefully and with self discipline.

Whatever is done in this regard in the future, the case of Chen Liangyu raises questions about the fundamental nature of the system. The 17th Party Congress confirmed a guiding policy in the fight against corruption of "treating both cause and symptoms, integrated control measures, simultaneous use of prevention and punishment with an emphasis on prevention," and China has supposedly already entered an era of "systemic anti-corruption". A "sunshine law" and measures to restrain those close to senior officials are both essential parts of a system to fight corruption and naturally need to be implemented as soon as possible. And for preventing corruption at source, establishing a check of power and democratic oversight mechanisms, deepening reform of the economic system, pressing on with reform of the political system, the journey ahead remains long.

Related Special Report:

Shanghai Pension Fund Scandal