China should protect its investments and seek higher returns if T-bond purchases factor into a Wall Street rescue.
By staff reporter Li
Zengxin
Foreign governments, including
China, could get stuck with a bill if
the U.S. Congress passes a US$ 700 billion bailout plan for Wall Street, said
Shen Minggao, Caijing’s chief economist. But China can take
steps to protect its financial interests.
Writing in Caijing Macroeconomic Weekly
Review, Shen said September 28 that a bailout could lead to new purchases of
U.S. Treasury bonds by China
if the U.S. government buys bad assets from
American financial institutions. Rescued financial firms would then use those
funds from the government to invest in China. In effect, China would
exchange its high-quality assets for American
T-bonds.
China is currently the
United States’ second largest
creditor after Japan. At the end of June,
China held US$ 503.8 billion in
T-bonds, accounting for 5.3 percent of the outstanding balance and nearly 20
percent of those held by foreign investors. By the end of July,
China’s holdings stood at US$ 518.7
billion. Therefore, China is more likely than other
countries to incur losses from a government bailout in four
ways.
First, the U.S. dollar may further
depreciate. If a bailout plan is completed in two years, the U.S. government
deficit could reach US$ 1 trillion, leading to the dollar’s depreciation.
Consequently, China’s T-bonds would lose
value.
Second, rising inflation would weaken
U.S. purchasing power. If the U.S.
dollar depreciates, import prices would rise and inflation could soar in the
United
States, which is a major importer of
consumables. If China holds too many long-term bonds,
its real returns could be negative.
Third, China’s
liquidity risk would grow. If foreign capital flees China, China may need to sell off T-bonds at
prices that could have fallen significantly.
Finally, China may shoulder a huge risk without proper
compensation if it buys T-bonds from the U.S. government.
The bonds would be sold to China to raise funds for buying bad assets from
U.S. financial institutions,
which would then invest in China. This process would represent a
de facto China-U.S. financial agreement for swapping China’s growth assets and U.S.
fixed-return assets.
To avoid these risks, China and other countries must require that they
receive a share of the benefits from rescued U.S. financial
institutions through the following means:
First, they should require a margin to cover
potential losses tied to U.S. inflation, or peg interest rates
to inflation to keep real returns on their T-bonds positive.
Second, they should require a form of
investment option. If the U.S. government’s investment in bad assets gets
value added, foreign institutional and government investors should reap benefits
along with the U.S. government. This should work
like a convertible stock option in which creditors may choose to convert debt
into shareholding.
Third, they should require a correlated
return scheme by pegging T-bonds to the salvaged financial institutions and
receive additional returns if they perform well.
Shen’s comments in the review’s seventh
edition appear with Caijing Columnist Talk – Why Wall Street Falls, which
features an exclusive interview with Shen Liantao, chief consultant to the China
Banking Regulatory Commission, focusing on the causes and influence of the
U.S. financial crisis – and
the lessons for China.