By Hu Shuli, editor of Caijing

(Caijing Magazine) It was odd from the start. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) issued a directive ordering Green Dam Youth Escort software pre-installed on all PCs sold in China. PC makers and marketers were required to comply with pre-installation testing by the end of June, and start sending MIIT monthly reports on PC sales and program installations. The ministry also said any who missed installation or reporting deadlines, as well as those who filed false reports or refused to report, would be disciplined.

The directive was an "internal document" for 20 days before MIIT issued an "official directive" June 9. By that time, however, the deadline was only 20 days away, giving the industry little time to act.

Green Dam elicited a few nods of approval for its avowed purpose of protecting youths from "pornographic and vulgar" content. However, the overwhelming response to the directive was negative. Some professionals called Green Dam technology junk, saying it makes PCs vulnerable to hackers and hijacking, increasing risks. Some said Green Dam's filtering scope is so broad and content restrictions so vague that the software amounts to excessive control.

Some analysts opined that choosing Green Dam software without open bidding may have violated the government's purchasing law and involved favoritism. Business organizations said the software's problems are related to "security, privacy, system stability, the freedom to disseminate information, and user choice rights." (See the article on Green Dam in the current issue of Caijing.)

Almost none of the critics played down the importance of protecting young people. But heated debate was sparked by questions over who should be the protectors, and how this protection should be handled. Moreover, the directive's short notice angered the public. Green Dam was dubbed "Leaky Dam."

The matter can be analyzed on several levels and from many angles. We think what's most important in the case is a review of the government's exercise of power. Are there legitimate and adequate moral grounds for mandatory pre-installation of filtering software? From a legal perspective, this is a struggle between state authority and public rights.

As we all know, citizens have to gather all sorts of public and proprietary information for daily life and at work. That activity is a basic right. In the process, citizens can personally use their best judgment to filter unwanted information. This is a right, not an obligation. Whether the information is legal or illegal depends on the collection channels, methods used and content.

As long as the information gathered is within the public domain, or access to private information is authorized, the public's right to collect is legitimate. In that sense, whether information should be judged "good" or "bad" is subject to debate according to social norms, government policies and political standards, which have ample latitude. Most of this civic activity falls outside the purview of law. The public's right to collect information should be protected.

To be sure, this is only one aspect of the issue of the public's right to collect information. For various reasons, including strong commercial interests, "bad" information can spread. Controlling information sources or distribution channels is not only difficult but subject to varying standards. Preventing "pornographic and vulgar" content from corrupting youths was a challenge even during media eras of the past. The task has become even more serious and complex in the Internet age.

With Chinese civil society still emerging, and society's self-governing ability limited, one cannot rule out public information rights. In our high-tech era, the Internet has opened a new arena. Preventing the Internet's ability to spread violent and vulgar information that corrupts youths is beyond the ability of social organizations alone. In this arena, public rights need support from state authority.

However, this support must be rendered as a service, not through coercion. It must be voluntary from the society. Otherwise, state authority exceeds its limits, and the effort is bound to fail for being incompatible with the long-range goal of fostering civil society's growth.

Here, the crux is how government agencies define public rights. MIIT has good intention to "build a green, healthy and harmonious Internet environment" and "prevent harmful information from reaching young people." But the way it defines public rights is inappropriate, overlooking the rights of citizens to collect information. Add to that the ministry's inept execution of the directive, a delayed announcement and imprecise procedures, and in the end, the MIIT's decision was rendered unacceptable to the public.

At this writing, Green Dam is set for launch. MIIT, after a long period of silence, responded to public outcry by saying that the software is to be "included or saved on PCs," not with mandatory pre-installation. The deadline is approaching, and the original directive is likely to become basically null and void.

To correct these missteps, we recommend what would be the most suitable measures. MIIT, strictly following legal procedures, should use fair, open and transparent administrative procedures to acquire the best filtering software through competitive bidding. The type of information filtered should be clearly described. Any PC buyer should be able to get this free software and decide independently whether or not to install it.

Also worth considering is a suggestion from some software engineers that the government make the filtering software open source. In this way, after a needless uproar and sidetracking, MIIT can become a model for balancing state authority and public rights.

Full article in Chinese: http://magazine.caijing.com.cn/2009-06-20/110187194.html